Nov. 14, 2003

by Lee Pace, Extra Points

CHAPEL HILL -- Last Saturday's 42-34 victory over Wake Forest included two decisions by John Bunting and the Tar Heel coaching staff that elicited a fair amount of interest in the aftermath. One was the decision to go for two points after Carolina scored its first touchdown of the second half, and the second was to gamble on fourth-and-1 late in the game instead of kicking a field goal.

An email from Al Newsome of Apex summarizes the scope of the questions:

"I have every confidence in John Bunting's ability to build a winning program at Carolina," he writes. "But I have two questions about his decision-making in the Wake Forest game.

"One, why did we go for two? I understand that two points would have made it a 14-point game, but what difference does one point mean when your team has all the momentum and is playing as well as the Heels were? If he had just had Dan Orner kick the extra point, then the game would have been decided by the final minute.

"Also, I didn't understand the decision to go for the fourth-and-1 with 33 seconds left in the game. I could not help but think about the Arizona State game, where they drove 62 yards in about 30 seconds to win the game. With a very reliable kicker (who was warming up during both time-outs at this juncture), Coach Bunting decided to risk a sure thing by attempting the fourth-down conversion."

Both are legitimate questions and provide an opportunity to delve into the decision-making process.

First, the two-point conversion.

It is impossible with nearly half the game left to compute all the scoring permutations possible. You are right that, in hindsight, having a nine-point lead at the end of the game instead of the eight-point lead would have been a world of difference. The Tar Heels would have been safe from a TD and two-point conversion by the Deacons. But at the time of the third-quarter score, you have to go with the here and now.

There is little difference in having a 12-point lead versus a 13-point lead.

But there's a significant difference in having a 14-point lead.

You had to figure Wake Forest would score a touchdown or two the rest of the game, and a 14-point lead would limit the Deacons to a tie with two scores and two conventional conversions.

Coaches have a little "cheat sheet" they use during games to help them make these decisions on the run. There is a column for decisions if your team is ahead; for each of 20 point differentials, the chart suggests whether you should kick for one or run/pass for two. There's also a column if you're behind and a recommendation for each of those point spreads as well.

For example, if a team is ahead by one, four, five, 12 or 19 points, the chart suggests the run/pass play for two points. That's because adding one point to your lead doesn't help much, but adding two points can help a lot.

The chart takes on more importance in the second half, because one assumes that there will not be as much scoring the rest of the game as there would be in the first half, thus the current point differential is more likely to be a factor.

So when Carolina went up by 12, Bunting and offensive coordinator Gary Tranquill looked at the chart and agreed to go for two. They had a good play as well--a sweep to the right side behind a wall of four blockers, three of whom had just shifted over from the left side. Unfortunately, a freshman got his assignment mixed up and missed the key block and the play was snuffed. At the time, they had no way of knowing that the Heels would be up by eight as the game wound down. They had to go with the odds at the moment.

Now for the decision to for the first down on fourth-and-1.

The Tar Heels had the ball at the Wake Forest 18 with 33 seconds to play. Already there are two significant differences to the Arizona State situation in the event the Heels did not get their first down.

One, Arizona State got the ball back with 1:30 to play. That's a lot more time than 33 seconds, and that would have been less after the Tar Heels had run the fourth down. So Wake Forest, by the time the play was over and the officials stopped the clock and signaled a change of possession, would have had probably 26 or 27 seconds left.

Two, Arizona State is a passing team. Wake Forest is not. Arizona State possessed a better quarterback, faster receivers and a better system suited to moving long distances in short bursts of time. The Deacons had popped the Tar Heels with two long pass plays earlier in the game, but the odds were they could not have traversed 82 yards in 27 seconds against a prevent defense--with no timeouts. Yes, I know the Tar Heel defense has been porous. But I think it could have held 82 yards for the three or four snaps Wake Forest would have had.

Still, Bunting called a time-out to confer with his staff and mull the decision over. His first instinct was to kick the field goal.

Then he considered the ball position on the hash mark--the right side--and factored in his knowledge that Orner, while certainly consistent, was a little less consistent from the right hash mark. Right-footed kickers generally impart some right-to-left spin on the ball, which makes their kicks curve slightly from right-to-left--exactly the same as a golfer imparting spin on a shot that makes it draw right-to-left. From an angle to the right of the uprights, a ball floating right-to-left has, in effect, a smaller target. That's why most kickers prefer the left hash mark.

Tranquill submitted his vote from the coaches' booth upstairs--go for it. Tranquill has bad memories of a similar situation from coaching at Michigan State in 1997. The Spartans led Purdue 23-13 with about two minutes to play and had a fourth down, three to go at the Purdue 18. Head coach Nick Saban wanted to kick the field goal. Tranquill believed that it was a two-score game anyway, so being up by 13 wasn't that much better than being up 10. He wanted to go for it.

Saban was the boss, though, and won the debate. Purdue blocked the field goal, returned it for a touchdown, covered an onside kick and scored a touchdown to win the game.

And both Bunting and Tranquill had evidence from only two hours earlier that, as remote as the possibilities were, it was indeed possible to block a place-kick and return it to the opposite goal. Carolina had done just that on a Wake Forest point-after in the first quarter, with Lionell Green scooping the ball up and racing downfield for two points.

The final component to the decision was the hot hand owned at the time by freshman tailback Ronnie McGill, who was getting stronger as the game wore on while Deacon tacklers were getting weaker. McGill had just run the ball eight consecutive plays and the offensive line in front of him was dominating the Deacon front line.

"We went with what was going right," Bunting says. "Lots of things were going right with the running game. We decided to go with what was working."

Interestingly, Tranquill called the same isolation play on fourth down that he'd called on third-and-short against Arizona State in the last two minutes a month ago. It wasn't blocked well against Arizona State and it wasn't blocked well against Wake Forest. McGill was hit twice at the line of scrimmage but fought off both blocks and made the game-saving first down.

Would you please clarify the term "red-shirt freshman?" Also, would you please elaborate on the origin of the term. How long can a football player be "red-shirted?"
Gary Sellers

"Red-shirting" is the practice of holding a player out of competition for a year while he is still in school attending class and practicing with the team. Generally players are red-shirted their first year on campus, but occasionally a player might play as a freshman and then be red-shirted. The reference to a "red-shirt freshman" means that the player is a freshman in eligibility but is now in his second year of college life after being held out his first year. A "true freshman" means that a player is in his first year in college.

This season, the Tar Heels have played 12 "true freshmen."

The term comes from the days when these players as well as others down the depth chart wore red jerseys in practice and served the role of running the opposition team's plays for the benefit of the starters. And that's exactly what they still do today--only they change jersey colors week-to-week to match that Saturday's opponent.

The Heels have not had a 1,000-yard rusher since Jonathan Linton in 1997. Ronnie McGill sure seems like the type of back we've been missing, but will he ever have a chance to put up those big individual numbers with the carries being distributed between so many backs? "
Gene Hollowell, Hobbsville, NC

Bunting has said all along he wants a premier back, a "bell cow" to be THE MAN and get the majority of reps. The reason Carolina was playing McGill, Jacque Lewis, Willie Parker and Chad Scott all season was that none of the four had yet emerged as that go-to tailback. Each did some things well and had liabilities also.

True freshmen usually take some time to develop, and McGill's early progress was delayed early in the year by a serious case of cramps. So it took some time for him to get to full speed and to get a good feel for the flow of the college game. He was stopped short on that crucial third-and-one at the end of the ASU game. He was also stopped short Saturday against Wake Forest, but he was stronger and more skilled as a runner by that time and broke two tackles to pick up the first down.

Now that McGill has shown what he can do, look for him to get more playing time the last two weeks of the year. He won't get 1,000 yards this year (he has 541 yards) but he's certainly good enough to do so in the future.